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Abstract Despite the scientific consensus on global warming, many people in the 
USA,—both ordinary citizens and elected leaders alike—remain skeptical of the 
need to act, and in fact remain skeptical of the idea that humans are contributing to 
global warming at all. Thus, environmental justice arguments based on United States 
carbon emissions and the disproportionate impact of rising temperatures and rising 
sea levels on tropical developing nations such as Vietnam frequently fall on deaf 
ears. This chapter explores the political and cultural construction of this deafness, 
seeking a better understanding of how and why so many Americans refuse to act 
to address global warming. The two main sources of this deafness that this chapter 
address are (1) the politics of carbon-intensive energy producers such as the coal and 
oil industries, demonstrating the ways in which those industries have distorted the 
debate over global warming, have found eager allies in political candidates willing 
to accept large campaign contributions, and—with the help of other industries such 
as automobile manufacturing and home construction—have encouraged the second 
main source of denial: (2) a culture of aggrandized individualism that places greater 
value on personal identity construction than on the national and global common 
good. Once these sources are established, the chapter recommends strategies for 
using narrative to overcome cultural and political resistance to climate change miti-
gation that may be effective not only in the United States, but in Vietnam as well.
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Since the election of Barack Obama in the United States, much has been made by 
the American news media of the new green economy, with the president himself 
calling for an investment in renewable energy and climate change mitigation 
 strategies that he believes will have the twofold effect of resuscitating the American 
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economy and preparing the nation for a hotter world. But so far, the overall impact 
of many of these strategies has fallen short of their goals. For example, one plan, 
the Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save Act of 2009 (better known by its 
nickname “Cash for Clunkers”), sought to reduce carbon emissions and to revitalize 
automobile sales by encouraging owners of inefficient and highly polluting vehicles 
to trade them in for newer, more efficient, and less polluting models. The govern-
ment subsidized the program by supplying the money to buy the old vehicles in 
order to ensure they would be taken off the road and destroyed. Americans traded 
in nearly 680,000 cars and trucks for more efficient replacements, saving an annual 
average of $32,947,886 in fuel, and preventing an estimated 379,000 metric tons of 
CO2 from being released annually (US Department of Transportation 2009). While 
any reduction of CO2 emissions is a good thing, at just 0.15% of the United States’ 
annual carbon emissions, such results fail to be inspiring, and in fact, raise the ques-
tion of why more people did not take advantage of the program. After all, 680,000 
may initially seem like a lot of cars, but it represents just 0.27% of the total number 
of registered vehicles in the United States, or the participation of just 0.22% of the 
US population.
Setting aside the economic reasons for not participating, from figures such as the 
United States’ total annual carbon emissions as reported by the United Nations’ 
Millennium Development Goals Indicators, we know that the United States is the 
second largest CO2 emitter in the world, and for a long time was the number one 
emitter. As individuals, Americans live a more carbon-intensive lifestyle than all 
but a few nationalities (UN Statistics 2010). Why did not more of them take advan-
tage of a program that would not only benefit themselves, but also help reduce this 
enormous carbon footprint?
The full response to that question has many complicated parts, and this chapter 
addresses several of them, but the short answer is that many people in the United 
States—both ordinary citizens and elected leaders alike—remain skeptical of core 
climate change assumptions. Some look at their local weather and refuse to believe 
the Earth is warming in any significantly different way than in other decades-long 
trends, and some, when they finally do confront the overwhelming data that the 
Earth is indeed growing warmer, quickly attribute that warming to the Earth’s natu-
ral long-term cycles of warming and cooling, and in effect deny that human activity 
has anything to do with it. In both scenarios, these skeptics implicitly claim that 
nothing humans can do will make any difference. But if humans want to continue 
to enjoy an earth that still resembles the earth that we all know now, and if we wish 
to avert the catastrophic loss of life, society and capital that unchecked greenhouse 
gas emissions will cause, we must find a way to break through enough skepticism 
to make a difference. This chapter first analyzes American climate change skepti-
cism to find its political and cultural origins, and then suggest ways to reframe or 
repurpose those origins to inspire people to act.
It might be easier to understand US climate change skepticism if seen through 
an example. In 2010 in the state where I live, Utah, the conservative state legislature 
responded to the US Environmental Protection Agency’s “carbon  reduction poli-
cies” by passing House Joint Resolution 12, which “urges the United States 
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Environmental Protection Agency to immediately halt its carbon dioxide reduction 
policies and programs and withdraw its ‘Endangerment Finding’ and related regu-
lations until a full and independent investigation of the climate data conspiracy and 
global warming science can be substantiated” (Utah 2010). It follows with a litany 
of unsubstantiated reasons why climate change science is flawed or otherwise can-
not be trusted, how climate change action will cost governments and tax payers 
billions of dollars that will simply line the pockets of climate change researchers, 
prevent the use of millions of acres of agricultural land, starve the people now eating 
food produced on that land, and “ultimately lock billions of human beings into 
long-term poverty” (Utah 2010). The paranoid hyperbole the bill expresses arises 
in part as a response to recent revelations that climate scientists altered findings to 
create a sense of urgency in the public, but it is also representative of the way many 
Utahns (though not all, obviously!) and many Americans feel about climate change. 
Letters to the editor published in my local newspaper often “debate” climate 
change, with typical entries often sounding like this one: “[Climate change science] 
is purely unadulterated ‘horse puckey.’ These clowns are in it for the money at 
yours and my tax money expense [sic]….With the recent revealing reports of false 
documents of global warming, Al Gore and his pals should be ‘cut off’ from our 
taxpayers’ funding….Climate change is a scam at our expense. Believe it. You far-
out loons are crazy” (Larsen 2010).
Neither the writer of this letter nor the sponsor of House Joint Resolution 12 is 
a scientist, nor are they apparently consumers of information from leading schol-
arly or even popular science journals or even mainstream media. So where do they 
get such strong feelings about climate change, and why would they believe climate 
change mitigation strategies are just some farfetched and elaborate conspiracy to 
steal their money?
One part of the answer is political: As early as 1998, the biggest energy producers 
in the United States, corporations such as Exxon, Shell, and BP, along with organi-
zations that they support such as the American Petroleum Institute and the Cato 
Institute, began a systematic campaign designed precisely to create public skepti-
cism on global warming. Taking the offensive on what they believed would be a 
downturn in demand for their products, or a tax on the carbon their products 
released, they began to funnel huge sums of money to organizations and scientists 
who would provide research to support the contentions that global warming did not 
exist and that human activity could not be definitively linked to climate change. 
Exxon alone ultimately paid more than $16 million between 1998 and 2004 to 40 
different groups, who in turn paid researchers to produce reports to support their 
claims. Perhaps the most cynical part is that the oil corporations never had any 
intention of ever proving the validity of their paid scientists’ work. In a memo 
leaked to the New York Times, the American Petroleum Institute declared that their 
campaign would be successful just by creating the appearance of doubt about cli-
mate change science. They knew as long as the media presented the issue of climate 
change as a debate, at least some of the public would believe the science was incon-
clusive and there would be no real motivation to limit fossil fuel exploitation or use. 
Since then, Exxon has claimed to “soften its stance” on global warming, and yet 
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they have continued to support climate denial institutes with millions of dollars 
every year since making that claim (Union of Concerned Scientists 2007).1
The energy corporations have also made large donations to political campaigns, 
giving candidates sympathetic to energy exploration and development vast sums to 
spend during elections. Since 1990, oil and gas companies have contributed more 
than $238.7 million to federal level campaigns, with 75% going to Republicans 
(Center for Responsive Politics 2010a, b). Candidates claim campaign donations do 
not necessarily mean they do whatever the donors tell them to. But in practice, it 
seems this is often the case.2 For example, in January 2010, the Alton Coal 
Development company made a $10,000 contribution to the reelection campaign of 
the energy sector-friendly governor of Utah, Gary Herbert. That same day, at the 
governor’s request, Alton’s application to open a mine in an environmentally sensi-
tive area was fast-tracked for approval. When pressed, the governor claimed the two 
incidents were unrelated, and as long as no record exists of his asking for the money 
or the coal company asking for his help with the approval process, corruption like 
this goes unpunished (Foy 2010).
In the case of the George W. Bush administration, scores of energy sector per-
sonnel moved into the government itself. Both President Bush and Vice President 
Cheney had been energy corporation executives, and as they filled positions within 
their administration, they relied heavily on former industry lobbyists, lawyers, 
managers, and board members. For example, the chief of staff for the White House 
Council on Environmental Quality from 2001 to 2005 was Philip Cooney, who had 
spent the previous decade as a lawyer for the American Petroleum Institute. As 
CEQ Chief of Staff, Cooney was able to act as a filter for all environmental infor-
mation distributed by the federal government, at times changing or deleting parts of 
reports that contained data or predictions contrary to industry opinion. When US 
government scientists in the Climate Change Science Program submitted their 2002 
Strategic Plan, Cooney made 650 changes, removing estimations of threats such as 
reductions in glacial ice and available melt water, and adding qualifying words to 
projected outcomes and impacts to make them seem less likely. Another tactic used 
by the Bush administration to thwart the dissemination of science contrary to their 
energy-intensive political goals included requiring scientists nominated for  advisory 
boards to pass interviews that tested them not for their expertise but for their 
 political allegiance (Shulman 2006, pp. 117–123).
1
 The climate change denial actions of ExxonMobil and the institutes it supports are well docu-
mented. For example, see Cushman (1998) and Harkinson (2009).
2 A prominent example at the federal level comes from James Inhofe, Republican Senator from 
Oklahoma and the most vocal skeptic of global warming in the Senate, who received $432,950 
between 2005 and 2010 in campaign contributions from the oil and gas industry, $206,654 from 
electric utility political action committees, and $176,983 from lobbyists. It is hard not to imagine 
that he is not saying what the energy industries want him to say. Figures from Open Secrets.org, 
the Web site of the Center for Responsive Politics. Retrieved from http://www.opensecrets.org/
politicians/summary.php?cid=N00005582&cycle=Career
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And while the Bush administration is an extreme case of oil industry influence 
over US policy and opinions, that influence did not appear over night. Rather, as 
Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway have convincingly shown (2010), it is the culmi-
nation of a long, concerted effort by conservatives to shift policy discussions away 
from scientific facts and the common, global good toward short-term economic 
interests. Following the lead of economists such as Thomas Schelling and William 
Nordhaus, whose reports on climate change in the early 1980s discounted the sci-
ence and leading scientists’ predictions of environmental disaster in favor of eco-
nomic uncertainty and a “wait-and-see” attitude, groups such as the Marshall 
Institute have been churning out “information” about global warming that has never 
withstood scientific scrutiny and whose purpose is simply to cloud the issues and 
to encourage more delay and inaction (Oreskes and Conway 2010, pp. 177–180). 
One such Marshall Institute report, Global Warming: What Does the Science Tell 
Us? (Jastrow et al. 1989), employed tactics such as presenting only the data that 
supported their conclusions and misrepresenting peer-reviewed research to make 
the report look like a credible refutation of climate change science. Because the 
report came from a policy think tank, it had never been peer reviewed, but because 
it appeared to use real scientific data (albeit in an incorrect way), many policy 
makers were duped. Similarly, releasing such reports to the public through conser-
vative media outlets such as the Wall Street Journal has allowed climate change 
deniers to distribute their ideas widely, but when leading scientists have written 
letters to the editor of the Journal to refute the science, the newspaper has either 
refused to print the rebuttals or edited them heavily to reduce their impact. Journals 
such as Science and Nature have eventually published full rebuttals, but to much 
smaller readerships and with the damage already done (Oreskes and Conway 
2010, pp. 209–213).
What the Marshall Institute and the energy industries they serve have always 
realized is that what they write are policy suggestions, and that their audience is 
composed of policy makers. They are not scientists and they are not writing scien-
tific articles that aim to have their science compete in the realm of science with 
other scientific claims. Instead, they have exploited the less rigorous standards of 
mainstream publishing to make their claims and have provided policy arguments 
and supporting materials to like-minded policy makers that say that the science is 
not the main thing to consider when it comes to climate change. And their story 
appeals to so many people in part because it preserves the status quo—no one has 
to do anything different in their version of the future—but in even larger measure 
because they often package these policy suggestions to take advantage of powerful 
elements in American culture.
Given such an overwhelming effort to mislead the public, it is no wonder that 
ordinary citizens such as my letter writing neighbor are convinced that global 
warming is not what the scientists say it is. In fact, the effort to deceive Americans 
about climate change has been so monumental; it would be easy simply to blame 
the politicians and the corporations for the denial of climate science and the per-
petuation of a carbon-intensive way of life. But the situation is more complicated 
than that; in fact, it goes to the very core of American cultural identity. After all, 
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what those corrupt corporations and politicians are really defending is the 
 uninhibited freedom for individuals to emit as much carbon as they can personally 
afford, to buy as many things and to use as much energy as they can pay for. (It is 
no coincidence that several of the climate change denial groups funded by Exxon 
have names like the Frontiers of Freedom Institute and the Free Enterprise 
Institute). And as selfish as that sounds, it is a privilege that resonates with vast 
numbers of Americans. Of course, the corporations are still intimately involved, 
since they are selling what the American people are buying, but a deep complicity 
runs between the average American citizen and the corporations that sell them the 
things they want.
A good way to see this complicity comes from the automobile industry, which 
by nature involves both a carbon-intensive production process and product. Since 
the establishment of fuel efficiency standards in the United States in 1975, the 
American automobile industry has argued consistently for the more lenient stan-
dards that have allowed them to cater to base consumer demands: more passenger 
and cargo space, more powerful engines, and more luxurious interiors. At the same 
time, these more lenient standards have allowed them to focus less on efficiency, and 
more on the idea that a car is not just a car, but an extension of the owner’s personal-
ity. A recent BMW commercial aired in the United States demonstrates this idea 
quite clearly. The commercial depicts beautiful cars being driven by people with big 
smiles on their faces, and the narrator says, “We realized a long time ago, that what 
you make people feel is just as important as what you make, and at BMW, we make 
joy” (BMW 2010). In the United States, big trucks are sold on the idea they make 
the owner tougher, more rugged. Minivans are sold by suggesting that parents are 
better parents if they buy the van that keeps their children safer, or now, better enter-
tained. The car’s efficiency is usually treated as an afterthought, even in ads for the 
most efficient cars. For example, commercials for the popular brand of hybrid elec-
tric and gas car, the Toyota Prius, mainly pitch a certain kind of way of being in the 
world, a personality that makes the world a happier place to live in.
In their “Harmony” TV commercial, Prius promises the buyer “more power and 
more space,” two of the things many Americans want in their car, and that “the 
world gets fewer smog forming emissions.” But the pitch for the environment is 
understated in comparison to the ad’s music and visual effects. The song in the 
background is Loretta Lynn’s, “Let Your Love Flow,” and as we watch the Prius 
drive along a highway, the landscape is transformed from a bland white to a vibrant 
green and blue made up of smiling children in blossoming plant costumes. 
Presumably because in the United States so many people are still in denial about 
global warming, the ad does not even mention the reduction in carbon emissions, 
suggesting instead the reduction in smog (Toyota 2010). Apparently, the important 
thing to take away from the ad is, as BMW put it, how it makes you feel. But this 
sort of identity construction at least is relatively benign in comparison to what hap-
pens in Ford’s “Built Ford Tough” commercials. In hundreds of different ads, vari-
ous aspects of their trucks’ designs are touted as being tougher than their 
competition, with the implication always being, as one ad asks the viewer directly 
at the end, “Are you tough enough?” (Ford 2007). In other words, the overdesign of 
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the truck, adding weight and losing efficiency, is justified by a consumer who also 
wants to be seen as stronger and more capable of physical work than anyone else.
One way to explain this emphasis on individual identity construction, as well as 
the toughness message from Ford, comes from the United States’ frontier history, 
whose mythology has been perpetuated by popular culture since the late eighteenth 
century. In brief, these stories feature individuals who go out into the wilderness 
with just the right tools and supplies and turn that wilderness into civilization. 
These are the stories of early explorers like Daniel Boone and Davy Crockett, but 
also of western cowboys like Wyatt Earp and Wild Bill Hickok who are portrayed 
as individuals who struggled heroically to tame the frontier. Of course the legends 
around these historical figures have exaggerated their accomplishments, and like all 
myths, some things are emphasized over others. It does not matter that Earp had 
brothers and friends, or that Crockett had a wife and children and neighbors helping 
him, the myth reinforces that these men as self-reliant individuals played an enor-
mous role in making the United States what it is today.
American studies scholars have rigorously debated the origins and mythic 
 quality of this rugged American individualism, and not all of that scholarship can 
be revisited here, but one common explanation suggests that, despite the truly inter-
dependent nature of early American life, “throughout the Revolutionary period and 
beyond, most Americans made their livings in agriculturally-based hamlets, or in 
free-standing farmer’s homesteads of one or a few families. These material circum-
stances seem likely to have encouraged a clear sense of economic self-reliance or 
independence in much of the population, which, in turn, may have eventually pro-
moted a generally more individualistic outlook among many settlers” (Grabb et al. 
1999, p. 527). This emphasis on economic self-reliance runs through a great deal 
of American thought, even through the writing of the United States’ greatest cham-
pions of the environment such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, 
and Wendell Berry, though they each in their own way also accompanied their cele-
bration of independence with warnings not to become “the tools of their tools” 
(Thoreau 1854, p.132). A second explanation for American individualism comes 
from what political scientist Barry Shain calls a conflation of “local communal 
hostility toward the provincial or the imperial (later national) center…with a com-
mon 20th century hostility toward all authority” (Shain, 1994, p. 86).3 Combining 
these two explanations gives us a competent portrait of the consumer that Ford 
truck commercials are trying to reach: Someone who earns his living by himself, 
with his hands, and who does not like being told what to do by anyone, and if not 
that person, someone who fantasizes about being him. In short, my letter writing 
neighbor.
3
 Such feelings are not exclusively American; many cultures and peoples feel similarly, even in 
Vietnam, where the saying goes, Phép vua thua lệ làng (the emperor’s law yields to village cus-
tom). But unlike in Vietnam, where there is also a saying, Biết thì thưa thốt, không biết thì dựa 
cột mà nghe (if you know, speak up, if not lean against a pillar and listen), America’s infatuation 
with individualism has led many to believe that all opinions have equal value.
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The values this myth and these advertisements perpetuate are precisely the ones 
he expressed in his letter to my local paper quoted above. The value of rugged 
economic self-reliance and distrust of outside authority combine to express the 
fear that government agencies, scientists, and representatives are using climate 
change as a way to tell him what to do and to take his money. The nexus of cor-
porations, politicians, and conservative media make the situation worse by pre-
senting irrational opinions about individual rights and misleading pseudoscientific 
information as rational counterarguments to the scientific certainty of global 
warming, but to an extent, they are successful because they play on a distrust of 
authority that has been enshrined in a culture and history that many Americans 
believe began with the Declaration of Independence. At the same time, Americans 
are inundated with corporate messages to indulge their sense of individual impor-
tance, to enjoy what they think they have earned, and ignore requests made for the 
common, global good.
Because the only information some Americans get is what they hear on 
 politically motivated radio and television programs, these citizens never fully con-
front the legitimacy of climate change science. But even if these Americans did 
engage with clearly articulated, sound scientific proof of climate change, their feel-
ings of skepticism and distrust, and ultimately the fear of losing their privileged 
access to an overabundance of material goods would most likely prevent them from 
being convinced to do anything. Climate scholar Mike Hulme has applied planning 
theorist Horst Rittel’s term “wicked problem” to these entrenched rejections of 
climate change science because they so intractably defy reasonable problem-solving 
strategies. But Hulme refuses to give up on the idea that it will take everyone in the 
world, especially climate change skeptics, to change our world for the better. 
Coincidentally, his answer to this “wicked problem” employs the exact same 
 methods of myth-making, identity construction, and even a distrust of authoritative 
solutions that helped make the problem so intractable to begin with.
Hulme’s book, Why We Disagree About Climate Change (2009), explores the 
many ways that people around the world perceive climate change, explaining how 
different values, beliefs, and forms of government combine to make “solving” 
 climate change as a problem impossible. Because “solving” climate change involves 
“uncertainty; inconsistent and ill-defined needs, preferences and values; unclear 
understanding of the means, consequences or cumulative impacts of collective 
actions; and fluid participation in which multiple, partisan participants vary in the 
amount of resources they invest” (Carley and Christie 2001, p. 156), no authoritative, 
top-down solution will ever satisfy everyone, even if one could be devised. Instead, 
Hulme argues, “we need to approach climate change as an imaginative idea, an idea 
that we develop and employ to fulfill a variety of tasks for us” (p. 329).
Treating climate change as a source of inspiration frees us to go more directly to 
the forms of identity construction that will allow us to find common ground and 
take action that will help us all. As the Alliance of Religions and Conservation sug-
gests, “Without…[narrative, myth, and metaphor], policies will have very few real 
roots…. Without narrative, few people are ever moved to change or adapt” (Alliance 
2007), and Hulme agrees: “In a world where the globalizing powers of capital, trade 
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and consumption separate us from the local stories that give meaning not just to 
climate, but also frequently to our lives, this [strategy] also offers a way of recon-
necting ourselves with climate through the telling of stories” (p. 356). In other 
words, to mobilize the world to act on climate change, we have to “inspire,” not to 
“convince.” We have to construct stories about ourselves and climate that allow us 
to better examine who we are, who we want to be, and what we want from life.
Such a strategy seems especially well suited to American climate change 
 skepticism. It allows us to build from our mythic past when we struggled to make 
a better life out of an unpredictable wilderness. It allows us to turn that distrust of 
authoritative, top-down decision-making into individualistic, everyday solutions 
that still allow for a high quality of life. And it allows us to construct narratives 
that connect the values of the past with the choices we must make in the present. 
As Hulme suggests, “We can use the idea of global climate change to tell ourselves 
new stories about … the consequences of our collective behaviours. We can use 
the idea of climate change to move beyond the separated categories of the physical 
and the cultural, beyond the framing of climate change that uses the language of 
problem and solution” (p. 357). Thus, we must express the idea of climate change 
in stories that can inspire the world, one individual at a time, to create a new way 
of understanding the choices we make and how they affect people who live far 
away from us.
Based on his analysis of the arguments that have obstructed climate change 
 mitigation strategies in the past, Hulme proposes a taxonomy of four myths that 
represent four human impulses or emotions as a way of understanding how stories 
we tell about climate change might motivate us: (1) Eden, which arises out of our 
sense of nostalgia, (2) Apocalypse, which arises from our fears for the future, (3) 
Babel, which expresses our pride for our sense of mastery and control over the envi-
ronment and other human beings, and (4) Jubilee, which engages with our sense of 
justice, of doing the right thing by others affected more dramatically by climate 
change (p. 358). But in order to know what will motivate a particular group best—as 
scholars of rhetoric and narrative from Aristotle to Kenneth Burke, Wayne Booth 
and others have shown—we first have to know something about the audience. 
A story can only do the work Hulme suggests when you know which story to tell.
For example, the climate story an individual American might tell another indi-
vidual American, over the phone, between father and son or sisters or close friends, 
will be different from the story told by director Roland Emmerich to the American 
mainstream public in the climate change thriller The Day After Tomorrow. The 
story I would tell to my Vietnamese colleagues while working in Vietnam might not 
be the same story I would tell my neighbor when chatting about our gardens and 
the weather. And even within the larger community of climate change skeptics, the 
story I might tell to inspire the writer of the letter to my local newspaper would not 
necessarily be the story I would tell to Jeff Kueter, president of the Marshall 
Institute.
So what would it take to inspire a skeptic like my letter writing neighbor? As 
Shain and Grabb have suggested above, and as the American Tea Party movement 
has confirmed, the idea of America that comes from its revolutionary period is very 
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much alive in the contemporary mainstream United States. The sense of 
 individualism, of disliking being told what to do by some far off distant ruler, of 
this irascibility somehow defining a quintessential American spirit are all common 
features not only of Ford truck commercials but also of contemporary conservative 
discourse. An extreme variant, the Appleseed movement, goes one step further by 
connecting those same characteristics to the type of marksmanship conjured up by 
recollections of minute men militia. When pressed to explain why every American 
should own an AR-15 rifle and know how to shoot it, Appleseed founder Jack 
Dailey expressed the sentiment common to all these groups: “Because they 
[unspecified antecedent, suggesting anyone] want to tell us what to do. And we 
don’t want them to tell us what to do” (Schwartz 2010, p. 41). Here, Hulme’s use 
of four myths can really help make clear what is going on. Fear for the future, 
combined with pride for the mastery over nature and other human beings and a 
sense of justice, have all been wrapped together with nostalgia for a time when 
problems could be solved by shooting at them. But it is the nostalgia that is the most 
important part. When a Tea Partier reaches for that tricorne hat, or an Appleseeder 
reaches for a gun, he or she is reaching for the past.
T. Boone Pickens, the oil tycoon turned wind farm proponent, does the same in 
his attempts to convince conservatives of the need to turn away from imported oil. 
Consider the rhetoric from his Web site for the Pickens Plan: “Lend your voice to 
the call for American energy independence….We are organizing the New Energy 
Army in every Congressional District” (Pickens 2010). This is not about reducing 
our carbon footprint—it is a revolutionary call to arms!
But there is more from the American Revolution than just guns and indepen-
dence that will resonate with Americans today. Stories of imperial imposition were 
commonplace in late eighteenth century colonial America, stories that told of unfair 
taxes yes, but also local stories of being taken advantage of by someone far away, 
stories of the inherent injustice in a colonial system that featured a distant king tell-
ing people what to do with the land they lived on. These stories involved real people 
who were forced to quarter soldiers in their homes, real people whose access to 
their local forests and its resources was limited by the Broad Arrow policy, real 
people whose potential was limited by the Royal Proclamation of 1763 barring 
them from westward migration.4 The Revolution was the means through which they 
expressed their independent spirits, refused to be hobbled any longer, sacrificed 
their time and revenue, and rose to their full potential.
Stories that equate corporate greed, excess, and callousness with imperial rule 
can be marshaled in the same way, and have been already, perhaps most notably in 
the case of BP’s former American CEO Tony Hayward’s yachting vacation during 
the massive 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The same could be said for the 
public outcry in 2008 when gasoline prices went through the roof while the oil 
companies posted record profits and their CEOs raked in outrageous salaries and 
benefits.
4
 For examples of these stories, see Roberts (2010) and Calloway (2006).
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But even these have not been enough to inspire my letter writing neighbors to 
give up their big trucks, ATVs, and snowmobiles. What else can be done? 
According to Hulme, it is “the local stories that give meaning not just to climate, 
but also frequently to our lives” (p. 358) that need to be told, so perhaps the stories 
my neighbors need to hear are the ones from local scientists predicting what cli-
mate change will mean for folks right here in my little mountain valley. Will cli-
mate change mean less snowfall? Will less snowfall mean fewer opportunities for 
skiing and snowmobiling? Will less meltwater mean the end of agriculture in our 
valley? Will droughts leave our forests more susceptible to mountain pine beetles 
and eventually wipe them out? Stories like these—intertwined with stories of fam-
ily outings, camping and fishing and hunting stories, stories of local adventure—
may finally touch the things my neighbors care about, help them imagine how 
their own lives will change in a warmer world, and make them nostalgic for the 
important role climate plays in the places and activities they hold dear. Motivating 
them to do something might then rely on appeals to the injustice of corporate indif-
ference to climate, to their own frontier spirit, or to doing something locally before 
the federal government imposes a solution from outside. But the rub will always 
be to get their attention first with something that already interests them, and the 
more local the origin of the story, the science, the activities, and the impacts, so 
much the better.
Of course, this is not how new science tends to be disseminated. Instead, the 
bigger the news, the more important the national journal it comes out in. And most 
scientists probably do not want to spend all their time writing different versions of 
their work for different audiences. In these cases, perhaps collaboration with writers 
from various locations likely to be impacted by what the scientists have found 
would help get the job of adapting their work to local audiences done. Greater 
partnerships between scientists doing cutting-edge climate research and local writ-
ers who can publish in the types of newspapers, magazines, and Web sites that 
skeptics already read stand a much better chance of inspiring the presently unin-
spired than even the best-written article in top journals like Science and Nature.
But not everyone in the United States who still remains somewhat skeptical of 
climate change science need so much frontier, Daniel Boone-type inspiration. 
Many others, still less than literate in science, still unsure what to make of the 
 conflicting claims, but with good hearts can be inspired by stories arousing their 
compassion and sense of justice. Moderately conservative “soccer moms” and dads 
around the country have already shown how issues that concern the health of their 
children can bring them to support environmental legislation and more climate 
friendly local and organic agriculture. Stories about their children’s relationship 
with climate in the future could be effective, but so too could stories about the suf-
fering of others. As writers such as Donald Brown have argued, ethical arguments 
about climate change need to be made more prominently in the United States 
(Brown 2010), and this group in particular seems likely to be a receptive audience 
to stories about the unequal distribution of negative effects of climate change and 
how children in other places around the world will have to bear a much greater 
burden than their own.
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The clarity of this injustice will not be lost on such an audience. The biggest 
carbon emitters have well-developed economies and mainly occupy temperate 
zones with greater elevations that will allow them to better weather negative 
impacts. Meanwhile, developing countries like Vietnam that have small carbon 
footprints, tropical climates, and low-lying coastal geography are predicted by the 
World Bank to suffer the worst of the consequences (Dasgupta et al. 2007). Put 
succinctly, Vietnam and countries like it are being forced to pay the true cost of the 
United States’ culture of consumption. With a compassionate audience, a story 
about the loss of ancestral lands, cultural customs, or displacement can resonate and 
make a difference, as long as it is centered around people and life experience, not 
just a vehicle for the science of sea level rise. This is the type of audience who can 
hear arguments about the injustice of the United States’ carbon culture and how the 
overconsumption of goods and energy in the United States causes devastation in 
other parts of the world and be inspired to act. But because these stories have to 
some extent already begun to be told, perhaps the problem is less of content and 
audience but of distribution, and the solution may again lie with the need for help 
from more local writers, with more of these stories in local publications linking the 
rest of the world to even the smallest communities in the United States.
And while the focus of this chapter so far has been on the political and cultural 
origins of US climate change skepticism and the kinds of narratives that might 
inspire those skeptics into action, it is important to recognize that this process of 
adapting global science to local audiences must occur everywhere in the world, 
using narrative to link each and every locality to the political, cultural, and indi-
vidual choices that impact and will be impacted by climate change, because the 
story of the injustice of climate change does not simply end with lifestyles in rich 
nations causing a disproportionate amount of climate affects in developing nations. 
In fact, it has a historical dimension and a contemporary quality of life dimension 
that makes the story even more complicated. The culture of consumption5 and 
aggrandized individualism that has made the United States the leading carbon pro-
ducer for decades has now become a global phenomenon, and the carbon emissions 
for developing nations have begun to rise, most dramatically in China, whose recent 
exponential growth in manufacturing and electricity production and consumption 
has brought it to the top of the list of yearly emissions, but also in Vietnam, whose 
carbon emissions increased by more than 300% between 1995 and 2005 (CAIT 
2010). China’s climate change ambassador Yu Qingtai has made strong arguments 
for considering the historical record of CO2 emissions as the basis for future emis-
sions reductions, arguments that attempt to reconcile the injustice of the West’s 
carbon-intensive colonial period with the victims of that period’s need to emit car-
bon to catch up with the West’s infrastructure and standard of living (Vaughan 
2009). But while this makes perfect sense historically and in terms of righting a 
wrong from the imperial past, to say that developing nations should emit as much 
5For an historical analysis of how Americans came to associate the accumulation of material 
things with status and personal identity, see, for example, Cohen (2003).
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carbon as have the developed nations does not make a lot of sense for the planet. 
What is needed is green development, development that gets the same social and 
economic results but without emitting the same amount of greenhouse gases.
Unfortunately, recent changes in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta do not appear to be 
the kind of development that ultimately will be sustainable. The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change has predicted a 1–3 m rise in sea levels over this next 
century, which means that a significant portion of Vietnam’s arable land will be 
submerged. With just a 1 m rise, 5% of Vietnam will be under water, and with the 
IPCC’s worst-case scenario, a 5 m rise, 16% of Vietnam disappears beneath the 
waves. In all cases, the areas hit first and worst are the fertile river deltas where 
much of the nation’s crops are grown, and where most of the people live. In the 5 m 
scenario, nearly 40% of the population—over 34 million people—will be displaced 
(Cruz et al. 2007). This is why the World Bank has predicted that Vietnam will be 
one of the five countries most impacted by climate change, with the world’s worst 
impacts in lost GDP, population displacement, and urban areas destroyed (Dasgupta 
et al. 2007). And yet, despite these dire warnings, many Vietnamese are rushing 
headlong toward a far greater carbon-intensive way of life.
One of the ways Vietnam has traditionally managed to keep a low carbon profile 
is local, sustainable production of food. For millennia, crops were grown for local 
consumption, rice paddy was rotated with mung beans and other fallow crops for 
nitrogen fixing, and grazed by buffalo and ducks for fertilizer. But now most of the 
rice grown in Vietnam is done so for export with the aid of chemical fertilizers, and 
the rice preferred by the Vietnamese to eat comes from Thailand (Vietnam News 
2010). Many farmers in the Mekong Delta have given up traditional farming alto-
gether, and have turned to raising shrimp because it is perceived to be the only way 
to get ahead financially. But whether such entrepreneurs can actually get ahead is 
uncertain, and converting a farm from traditional, sustainable agriculture to shrimp 
aquaculture suddenly turns formerly carbon neutral land into one of the many cogs 
in a global greenhouse gas making machine.
Mr. Bich, a shrimp farmer in the Mekong Delta’s Vinh Chau District, explained 
his experience making this transition. An international shrimp food producer gave 
him the loans to have his paddy excavated for shrimp ponds and to buy his initial 
stock of fry, the necessary equipment such as feeders and water agitators, and 
shrimp food. The food, which he had to sign a long-term contract for, comes from 
“trash fish” harvested from fisheries off the Pacific coast of South America. Since 
Mr. Bich converted all his land to shrimp production, the earnings he makes from 
the shrimp now have to provide enough to pay back the loan and continue to buy 
the contract’s worth of shrimp food, plus all his other costs of living including the 
food he and his family eat, which may now come from as far away as Thailand, 
China, or even the United States. The land has been stripped of vegetation to 
increase the temperature of the ponds, which is good for producing shrimp, but not 
so good for keeping the house cool, preventing erosion, or growing fruits or vege-
tables for family consumption. Maybe if Mr. Bich were the only one who has done 
this, the impact would be minimal, but of course he is not alone. With the encour-
agement of both the provincial as well as the national government, many Vietnamese 
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farmers have converted their farms completely to aquaculture—up to 98% of all 
farmers in some Mekong Delta districts (Ngo 2010).
When asked why he decided to switch to aquaculture, unsurprisingly Mr. Bich 
answered that he had heard a story about someone else in his district who had made 
a fortune that way. Here too narratives are playing an important role. But what other 
narratives, what “local stories that give meaning not just to climate, but also fre-
quently to our lives” might be told in the Mekong Delta to raise awareness of 
impending climate changes and consequences?
Of course, the Vietnamese will know the best answers to this question. As an 
outside observer of Vietnamese culture, though, some possibilities come to mind. 
Ho Chi Minh’s famous remark, “Không có gì quý hơn độc lập, tự do,” (Nothing is 
more precious than independence and freedom) can be found on posters in public 
spaces throughout Vietnam. Stories that highlight sustainable agriculture could 
certainly draw on this sentiment, especially in contrast to the situation of having to 
follow the dictates of contracts with foreign companies to which one is perpetually 
in debt.
More generally, care for the environment can frequently be found in Vietnamese 
folk literature. Stories from folk tradition can do the same kind of work that myths 
of origination do to tap into deeply held and often unquestioned beliefs, feelings, 
and motivations. For example, most Vietnamese will already know the story of 
Chu Cuoi, the boy in the moon. In brief, the story involves a boy who finds a magic 
tree whose leaves heal all wounds and illnesses. He knows he must care for the 
tree diligently, and that as long as he does so, it will provide for him, but when he 
finally does allow it to be mistreated or neglected, the tree pulls up its roots and 
begins to rise into the sky. The boy quickly latches on, trying to weigh it down. 
But the tree continues upward, stranding the boy in the moon, where he sits to this 
day, playing his flute and pining for his terrestrial home. Different versions of the 
story change some of the details, but the essence of the story is always the same: 
the boy has an obligation to the tree and there are sad consequences when that 
obligation is not met.
To better highlight positive, proactive behavior, one might harness the story of 
Mr. Thirty, a tiger who takes care of an old woman after killing her son. In her grief, 
the woman roams the forest until she finds the tiger and then scolds him for pre-
venting her son from caring for her in old age, shaming him deeply. The tiger 
begins to make up for her loss by delivering wild game to her door, and supports 
her for the rest of her life. Even after her death, the tiger continues to bring an offer-
ing of food to her grave on the thirtieth day of each lunar month. The story reminds 
us of the dangers the environment holds, as well as its ability to care for us when 
we act dutifully and with respect. It is also a story about obligations and the need 
to think about the larger ramifications of our actions.
But as before, every audience will be different, and so these stories may or may 
not resonate. For young, urban Vietnamese, perhaps the stories they most need to 
hear are ones that take what they may already know—climate change is real and 
will have huge negative impacts on Vietnam—with what they may not put 
together—that the endless pursuit and accumulation of material things such as the 
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latest, most fashionable motorbike, car, or cell phone, when multiplied around the 
globe makes climate change’s worst-case scenarios all the more likely. Vietnamese 
youth are also great candidates for telling stories of their own, for connecting with 
the rest of the world and making people in the industrial West understand how their 
lifestyles affect one another.
Telling stories about climate change that intertwine the deepest roots of our 
cultures with real people making real decisions in the world today can help us 
achieve what Hulme suggests:
We should use climate change both as a magnifying glass and as a mirror. As a magnifier, 
climate change allows us to conduct examinations—both more forensic and more honest than 
we have been used to—of each of our human projects: whether they be of projects of personal 
well-being, self-determination, liberated or localized trade, poverty reduction, community 
building, demographic management, or social and psychological health. Climate change 
demands that we focus on the long-term implications of short-term choices, that we recognize 
the global reach of our actions, and that we are alert both to material realities and to cultural 
values. And as a mirror, climate change teaches us to attend more closely to what we really 
want to achieve for ourselves and for humanity. (pp. 362–363)
Stories can connect us with our past and inspire us to make good decisions for the 
future, all while providing a better understanding of the global dimensions of our 
actions in the present. Whether inspiring climate skeptics in the United States to act 
for the greater good, or helping farmers in Vietnam to imagine other ways to lift 
themselves out of poverty, scientists must become storytellers too, or enlist the help 
of local storytellers to adapt facts and predictions to plots and narrative, to give the 
science flesh and bone and heart.
Neither Hulme nor I mean to suggest that narrative alone can help us address 
global climate change. Only through science can we begin to know the full range 
of physical effects a warmer world will create. But as the interdisciplinary nature 
of this volume demonstrates, it will take approaching climate change from every 
conceivable intellectual direction to know what climate change will mean, and it 
will take stories that reflect each of our own cultures’ values and aspirations to 
inspire the world, one individual at a time, to act.
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